cloudflare-tunnel¶
Outbound-only public ingress. cloudflared dials out to Cloudflare's edge — no port-forward, no NodePort, no public IP on the cluster. Cloudflare Access sits in front as an edge auth gate, and traffic is delivered to the in-cluster Istio Gateway — the same chokepoint LAN traffic uses (see the network overview).
In-cluster components¶
| file | role |
|---|---|
deployment.yaml |
cloudflared Deployment (token-managed tunnel, image cloudflare/cloudflared:2026.10.4, metrics on :2000) |
external-secret.yaml |
ESO pulls the tunnel token from Vault (secret/cloudflare-tunnel/token) into the cloudflare-tunnel-token Secret |
namespace.yaml |
the cloudflare-tunnel namespace |
The tunnel is token / dashboard-managed: the pod runs cloudflared tunnel run with a TUNNEL_TOKEN. Routing (public hostnames) and Access policies live in the Cloudflare Zero Trust dashboard, not in Git — the manifests only run the connector.
Step-by-step walkthrough (JP): 自宅からポート開放なしで認証付きアプリを公開 — Cloudflare Tunnel + Access. This README documents how the pattern is wired in kensan-lab specifically (token via Vault/ESO, routed to the Istio Gateway).
How traffic gets in¶
%%{init: {"flowchart": {"htmlLabels": true}} }%%
flowchart LR
Net([Internet]) -->|HTTPS| CF["Cloudflare edge<br/>TLS termination + DDoS"]
CF --> ACC{"Cloudflare Access<br/>OTP gate"}
ACC -->|allowed| CFD["cloudflared<br/>(cloudflare-tunnel ns)"]
CFD --> GW["Istio Gateway<br/>(istio-system svc)"]
GW --> APP["app"]
classDef default fill:#26221D,stroke:#4A4232,color:#FCFAF6
classDef ext fill:#8A4B12,stroke:#FDBA74,color:#FCFAF6
classDef gate fill:#075985,stroke:#38BDF8,color:#FCFAF6
class Net,CF ext
class ACC,GW gate
The connection between cloudflared and Cloudflare is dialed outbound by the pod (QUIC), so nothing needs to be opened inbound at the router. Traffic then rides that established tunnel back down to the Gateway.
Tunnel configuration (dashboard)¶
Networking → Tunnels → create a tunnel → copy the token (stored in Vault, below). Then add a Public Hostname:
| field | value |
|---|---|
| Subdomain / Domain | e.g. kensan / yu-mins.com |
| Type | HTTP |
| URL | http://<istio-gateway-service>.istio-system.svc.cluster.local:80 |
Point the URL at the in-cluster Istio Gateway service (not directly at an app), so external and LAN ingress converge on one Gateway that owns TLS re-termination, routing, and Keycloak auth.
Token handling (GitOps-friendly): the token lives in Vault at secret/cloudflare-tunnel/token; ESO syncs it into the cloudflare-tunnel-token Secret (refreshInterval: 1h), which the Deployment consumes as TUNNEL_TOKEN. Rotating the tunnel = update Vault → ESO resyncs.
NetworkPolicy: the cloudflare-tunnel ns is not istio-injected, so it uses a per-ns NetworkPolicy (kubernetes/network/network-policy/cloudflare-tunnel.yaml, see the network-policy guide). cloudflared needs egress for: DNS (53), Cloudflare edge over QUIC (UDP 7844) with TCP 443 fallback, and the Istio Gateway service.
Access configuration (dashboard)¶
Zero Trust → Access → Applications → Self-hosted:
| field | value |
|---|---|
| Application domain | the tunnel's public hostname (e.g. kensan.yu-mins.com) — must match the Tunnel route |
| Session Duration | e.g. 24h (independent of the inner Keycloak session) |
Policy: Action: Allow, selector Emails = your address, delivered via Email OTP.
Access is an edge gate, not the only auth: unauthenticated requests die at Cloudflare's edge before entering the tunnel, while the in-cluster Istio Gateway still enforces Keycloak auth on every route. The current interim model is OTP in front of *.yu-mins.com; whether to keep Access as a second factor, collapse it into Keycloak OIDC, or drop it for pass-through is the deferred decision in ADR-016.
Reference values¶
| element | value |
|---|---|
| external domain | *.yu-mins.com (Cloudflare Tunnel) |
| namespace / Secret | cloudflare-tunnel / cloudflare-tunnel-token |
| token Vault path | secret/cloudflare-tunnel/token |
| connector image | cloudflare/cloudflared:2026.10.4 |
Related¶
- Network overview and the two ingress paths: network README
- External-gate model (Access vs Keycloak-only vs pass-through): ADR-016
- Cloudflare-side edge, LB IPs, known issues:
.claude/rules/network-ingress.md - Cloudflare security advisory: eMudhra certificate compromise